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Renting Space on the Shoulders of Giants:
Madey and the Future of the Experimental
Use Doctrine
Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied,
123 S. Ct. 2639 (2003).
The experimental use doctrine in patent law protects alleged infringers
who use patented inventions solely for experimental purposes, such as
testing whether a device functions as claimed or re-creating a process to
observe its effects from a scientific perspective.1 The judicially created
exception traces its lineage back nearly two hundred years.2 Although the
exception has always been construed narrowly, it grew narrower still in
October 2002 when the Federal Circuit issued its opinion in Madey v. Duke
University.3 Madey reformulated the experimental use doctrine and cast
considerable doubt on its continued viability as a defense in patent
infringement cases involving universities. As a result, university researchers
1. This Comment discusses the third-party experimental use defense, sometimes called the
"research exception." This third-party defense should not be confused with the first-party
experimental use defense, which excuses patent owners who have failed to file for patents within
one year of using their inventions commercially, as required by 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), because they
have been testing their inventions to be sure they are safe or otherwise ready for patenting. See
City of Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 134-37 (1877).
2. The experimental use doctrine originated in 1813 with the case of Whittemore v. Cutter, 29
F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600) (Story, J.). By 1861, it was considered
"well settled, that an experiment with a patented article for the sole purpose of gratifying a
philosophical taste, or curiosity, or for mere amusement, is not an infringement of the rights of the
patentee." Poppenhusen v. Falke, 19 F. Cas. 1048, 1049 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 11,279).
3. 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2639 (2003); see also Jennifer
Miller, Sealing the Coffin on the Experimental Use Exception, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 12
(discussing the case and the briefs filed for and against certiorari).
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accustomed to standing on the shoulders of giants by studying patented
technologies freely may now be forced to rent space on those shoulders
instead.4
This Comment argues that the Madey court erred when it characterized
university research as driven by a business interest in competing for
prestige, students, and research grants. Not only does this view
oversimplify experimental use defense by causing it to turn on the status of
the defendant rather than the nature of the contested use, but it also
undermines the balance between innovation and access that lies at the heart
of the Patent Act. The Federal Circuit should have instead crafted a more
nuanced experimental use exception that protects educational
experimentation on patented inventions. Such a rule might not help Duke in
its dispute with Professor Madey, especially if the record on remand
confirms that Duke was experimenting with rather than experimenting on
Madey's invention, but it would allow future researchers to continue testing
and teaching about patented inventions without fear of being sued.
I
In 1997, Duke University removed physicist John Madey as director of
the free electron laser research lab he had founded. Madey resigned from
the faculty and eventually sued Duke for patent infringement for continuing
to use several pieces of equipment Madey had invented and patented. Duke
moved for summary judgment, and the district court held that Madey had
failed to demonstrate that Duke, as an educational institution, had a
commercial purpose for using the patented equipment. 5 Madey appealed,
and the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded. The Federal Circuit
determined that only a "very narrow and strictly limited ' 6 experimental use
exception had survived its previous decisions in Roche Products, Inc. v.
Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.7 and Embrex, Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp.
8
It characterized the defense as "limited to actions performed 'for
amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry."'
9
4. Isaac Newton, in one of the most frequently quoted lines in intellectual property law,
reportedly declared, "If I have seen farther, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants." The
historical origins of this statement are traced in ROBERT K. MERTON, ON THE SHOULDERS OF
GIANTS (1965).
5. See Madey v. Duke Univ., 266 F. Supp. 2d 420, 424-28 (M.D.N.C. 2001), affd in part and
rev'd in part, 307 F.3d 1351, cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2639.
6. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362.
7. 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Congress responded to Roche by creating a limited safe
harbor for experimentation by generic drug manufacturers. See Drug Price Competition and Patent
Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 202, 98 Stat. 1585, 1603 (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2000)).
8. 216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
9. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362 (quoting Embrex, 216 F.3d at 1349).
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Although the Madey court did not provide any examples of the types of
uses that would qualify for the experimental use defense, it delineated the
boundaries of the defense by examining what uses would not qualify.
First, the Madey court stated that the experimental use exception should
not insulate commercial research from claims of patent infringement.' 0 The
court worried that Duke might be using the free electron laser for direct
commercial gain by conducting research that might lead to patentable
discoveries. As Judge Gajarsa noted, "Duke,... like other major research
institutions of higher learning, is not shy in pursuing an aggressive patent
licensing program from which it derives a not insubstantial revenue
stream."''
Second, the court expressed concern that use of the laser might unfairly
advance Duke's business interests regardless of any resulting commercial
applications. Its formulation of what constituted a business interest,
however, proved exceedingly broad. The court stated:
[M]ajor research universities, such as Duke, often sanction and
fund research projects with arguably no commercial application
whatsoever. However, these projects unmistakably further the
institution's legitimate business objectives, including educating and
enlightening students and faculty participating in these projects.
These projects also serve, for example, to increase the status of the
institution and lure lucrative research grants, students and faculty. 2
Under such a broad definition of business interest, it is difficult to
conceive of any activity conducted by a university that would count as a
"strictly philosophical inquiry" and qualify for the experimental use
exception. It is not surprising, then, that press reports about the Madey
decision portrayed the case as effectively overturning the experimental use
exception, 3 despite the court's protests to the contrary.
1 4
II
The notion that use of a patent with commercial intent should not be
protected by the experimental use doctrine is longstanding. In the same year
that Justice Story created the experimental use exception, he held that users
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1363 n.7.
12. Id. at 1362.
13. See, e.g., Stephen B. Maebius & Harold C. Wegner, Ruling on Research Exemption Roils
Universities, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 16, 2002, at C3 ("[Madey] promises to set off a lively debate about
the direction of research at federally funded universities ... and their very right to continue to
function as research institutions free from third-party patent problems.").
14. See Madey, 307 F.3d at 1360 ("Our precedent, to which we are bound, continues
to recognize the judicially created experimental use defense, however, in a very limited form.").
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with "intent to use for profit" could not avail themselves of the defense.' 5
The Federal Circuit declared more recently in Roche Products that activities
conducted under the "guise of scientific inquiry" will not qualify as
experimental when they have "definite, cognizable, and not insubstantial
commercial purposes."
16
The inability of commercial users to claim experimental use does not
imply, however, that activities conducted by noncommercial entities
automatically constitute experimental use. The Federal Circuit opinion in
Madey expressed concern that the district court had "attached too great a
weight to the non-profit educational status of Duke" and had failed to delve
into the details of how Duke had been using the microwave guns and the
free electron laser covered by two of Madey's patents. 17 Despite its
criticism of the district court, however, the Federal Circuit crafted its own
bright-line, status-based rule, making the same mistake as the district court,
but in reverse. Instead of formulating an experimental use doctrine capable
of looking beyond the identity of the defendant to the nature of the
contested use, it effectively precluded all universities from successfully
invoking the experimental use defense by characterizing prestige and the
formation of a high-quality faculty as "business interests."
The business interest test was initially developed in Pitcairn v. United
States 8 to plug a conceptual gap in the commercial-noncommercial
distinction. The government, as a noncommercial entity, had sought to
exploit the experimental use defense despite acting like an ordinary
consumer rather than a researcher. Pitcairn involved a dispute over the use
of helicopters containing patented rotor structures and control systems. The
United States claimed that it should not be forced to pay a royalty for use of
some of the helicopters because they were built to test the lifting ability,
flight speed, and range of the equipment. The Court of Claims rebuffed this
argument. It noted that the record contained no evidence that the helicopters
were built solely for experimental purposes. 19 It also considered tests and
demonstrations to be intended uses of the helicopters and "in keeping
with the legitimate business of the using agency., 20 In Pitcairn, the
experimentation was fairly clearly linked to the government's interest in
using the helicopters for military purposes. The government was not acting
out of "curiosity," but instead as a consumer interested in ensuring the
helicopters it purchased would meet its needs.
15. Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 12,391) (Story, J.).
16. Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
17. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362.
18. 547 F.2d 1106 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
19. 1d. at 1125.
20. Id. at 1125-26.
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The same is not true when universities study or teach how a patented
device or process works. The mission of universities is to expand the scope
of human knowledge. A large component of this mission involves
experimenting on inventions to test their limits and understand how they
work. Treating activities that advance this mission as furthering a business
interest ignores the fact that they simultaneously constitute the type of
curiosity-driven inquiries at the heart of the experimental use exception. To
say, as the Madey court effectively did, that performing this function
precludes institutions of higher education from invoking the experimental
use exception allows the tail to wag the dog.
The practical effect of the Madey decision is to draw an artificial line
between experiments conducted by individuals and experiments conducted
by university researchers. Individual experimenters presumably conduct
research for the purposes of "educating and enlightening" themselves and
potentially enhancing their "status," yet Madey regards both as business
objectives when carried out in a university setting. This distinction without
a difference illustrates the shortcomings of basing the experimental use
exception on the status of the defendant claiming it, as the Madey court did
by adopting such a broad definition of business interest.
The policy considerations underlying both the Patent Act of 1952 and
the Copyright Clause itself buttress the view that the Madey court defined
business interest too broadly. Patent law establishes a delicate balance
between incentivizing new discoveries and stifling innovation by limiting
subsequent access to those discoveries. 2' Exempting core educational
activities from liability for infringement helps maintain this balance.
Replicating a patented process in the classroom to demonstrate how it
works without seeking a license is unlikely to have any discemable
commercial impact on the inventor.22 Compared to this minimal impact on
the incentive to create, allowing experimentation upon patented inventions
substantially advances the "Progress of Science and useful Arts. 23
Patent law expects inventors who seek legal protection to disclose their
discoveries in exchange for a limited monopoly. 24 Experimentation and
teaching represent integral components of the disclosure process. Allowing
a university professor who wants to understand a patented process to study
it in the lab and replicate it in a classroom demonstration helps to
disseminate the information contained in the patent specification in a more
palatable fashion. It also functions as a form of peer review, ensuring that
21. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989).
22. The lack of a commercial impact depends on respecting the distinction drawn below
between experimenting on an invention and experimenting with an invention. See infra Part II.
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
24. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (requiring a "written description" and disclosure of the "best
mode" of using an invention).
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patent claims are valid and can be replicated.25 Moreover, experimentation
may uncover additional information about a patented process or device that
even the inventor did not fully grasp.26 Universities have traditionally
played a central role in testing new technologies and publishing findings
that inspire subsequent rounds of innovation. Unlike individuals, they can
marshal the resources and institutional support necessary to conduct
research on the scale required to make scientific breakthroughs. Madey
threatens this vital function by categorically denying institutions of higher
education the protection of the experimental use exception.
III
Given the undesirability of a categorical rule either granting universities
carte blanche to ignore patents or preventing universities from ever
invoking the experimental use defense, the task of crafting a viable
experimental use exception remains. Fortunately, the scholarly literature
provides substantial guidance on this point. Although scholars disagree on
the proper scope of the experimental use exception, two principles
frequently guide their analysis: The experimental use exception should only
cover noncommercial use of a patented invention, and the exception should
protect those who experiment on an invention but not those who experiment
with an invention.
27
Although universities are almost always nonprofit institutions, some
university labs resemble commercial enterprises to the extent they seek to
patent and profit from their inventions.28 Allowing these labs to claim the
25. See Ned A. Israelsen, Making, Using, and Selling Without Infringing: An Examination of
35 U.S.C. Section 271(e) and the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement, 16 AIPLA
Q.J. 457, 470 (1989).
26. For example, the Seattle-based company Immunex applied for a patent covering the use
of CD40 Ligand, a protein made by helper T-cells, to enhance immune system function. Immunex
apparently did not realize that manipulation of CD40 molecules could also help combat drug-
resistant cancers. That discovery was made by a group of scientists working at Birmingham
University in England. See Jon Hunt, Molecule CD40 Can Switch Off Cancer Cells, BIRMINGHAM
POST, Mar. 18, 1999, at 6.
27. See Lauren C. Bruzzone, The Research Exemption: A Proposal, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 52, 68-69
(1993) (reviewing the literature and proposing a similar set of guiding principles); see also infra
note 33.
28. The links between universities and industry have grown over time, especially in the patent
context. The Bayh-Doyle Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, §§ 200-211, 94 Stat. 3015, 3019-28 (1980)
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-211 (2000)), which authorized universities to seek
patents on inventions created with public funding, set off an explosion in the number of patents
held by institutions of higher education. In 2000 alone, "U.S. universities were awarded 3,272
patents, executed 3,606 licensing agreements, formed 368 startup companies and earned more
than $1 billion in licensing revenue." Janet Forgrieve, Mining the Technology, ROCKY MTN.
NEWS, Apr. 22, 2002, at I B. The expansion of university patent portfolios has been accompanied
by an increase in private funding for academic research, as intended by the Bayh-Doyle Act.
From 1980 to 1998, industry funding grew at an annual rate of 8.1%, reaching $1.9 billion in
1997. Robert Miranda, Corporate U, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 15, 2000, at 1J. This
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protection of the experimental use defense based on their connection to
nonprofit institutions would give them an unfair advantage in the
marketplace. As Suzanne Michel has argued, "[I]t is inequitable to allow an
institution to gain from the existence of the patent system without
submitting to the restrictions that are necessary for the system to exist in the
first place.",29 Accordingly, the traditional prohibition on commercial
entities availing themselves of the experimental use exception should be
applied in a flexible rather than formalistic manner, to prevent ostensibly
nonprofit labs motivated by commercial considerations from abusing the
exception.3 °
An appropriate experimental use exception would also recognize that
some inventors set out to create tools specifically designed for use in
research and teaching. Since professors constitute the normal market for
such tools, waiving infringement liability would largely eviscerate the
economic incentive to produce research tools in the first place. 31 As
Professor Donald Chisum, author of the leading patent law treatise, once
observed while testifying before Congress, "[I]f you had a patent on a
microscope and its only use was in research, you wouldn't want to say that
anybody could make and sell microscopes, since they are always used for
research. 32
One way to solve this dilemma is to distinguish between experimenting
with an invention and experimenting on an invention, and to afford
protection only to the latter.33 When professors experiment with inventions
proliferation of ties between businesses and universities has led one journalist to decry the
emergence of an "academic-industrial complex." Richard Louv, Patent-or-Perish Academia
Could Cost Us All, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 3, 2002, at A 14.
29. Suzanne T. Michel, The Experimental Use Exception to Infringement Applied to
Federally Funded Inventions, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 369, 400 (1992).
30. Several authors have argued that the most flexible way to police the line between
commercial and noncommercial use is to establish a liability rule that prevents a patent owner
from obtaining an injunction against experimental uses but allows the owner to seek damages
later if the experimentation results in commercial gain. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the
Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1076-77
(1989); Janice M. Mueller, No "Dilettante Affair": Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to
Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1, 9, 54-66 (2001); David
L. Parker, Patent Infringement Exemptions for Life Science Research, 16 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 615,
659-60 (1994).
31. Scholars occasionally argue that nonmonetary incentives will maintain a healthy supply
of scientific bieakthroughs in the absence of patent protection. See, e.g., Michel, supra note 29, at
400. As Rebecca Eisenberg has persuasively argued, though, whether science would be advanced
more by patent protection or free access is ultimately an empirical question. See Eisenberg, supra
note 30, at 1030.
32. Transgenic Animal Patent Reform Act of 1989: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Intellectual Prop., and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101 st
Cong. 104 (1989) (statement of Prof. Donald Chisum), quoted in H.R. REP. NO. 101-960, at 56
(1990).
33. See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 878 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(Newman, J., dissenting); see also Parker, supra note 30, at 622 n.37 (quoting Ronald D.
Hantman, Experimental Use as an Exception to Patent Infringement, 67 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2003]
The Yale Law Journal
by using them instrumentally to advance other goals, the risk of upsetting
the incentive to innovate is evident.34 In contrast, the use of devices and
processes as objects of study rather than tools does not present comparable
concerns. 35 Of course, requiring those experimenting on an invention to
seek a license could generate some additional revenue for the patent owner,
assuming those forced to pay did not respond by foregoing use of the
invention altogether. But the marginal effect on incentives to invent would
be negligible, since such researchers do not constitute the core market for
the invention.36 Moreover, this minor impact on the patent owner would be
outweighed by the net contribution to the storehouse of knowledge
generated when researchers are allowed to supplement the basic disclosure




The Federal Circuit should pull back from its decision in Madey
and replace its expansive definition of business interest with a more
nuanced experimental use doctrine-one that insulates the core academic
functions of universities from lawsuits by protecting noncommercial
experimentation on patented inventions. This reformulated experimental
use exception would not lead inevitably to a reversal in Madey, since it is
simply impossible to say before a more detailed record is developed on
remand whether Duke would qualify for the relatively narrow experimental
use exception outlined above. Nevertheless, reining in Madey would
preserve the important role universities have traditionally played in
advancing the progress of science, and allow researchers to stand firmly on
the shoulders of giants rather than merely rent space.
-Tom Saunders
OFF. Soc'y 617, 639 (1985)); id. at 656 ("In England, Germany, and most of Europe,
experimentation on a patented invention is covered under the research exemption, while
experimentation using a patented invention to achieve other results falls outside the exemption.").
34. See Eisenberg, supra note 30, at 1074.
35. Id. at 1074-75.
36. Professor Robinson, in an influential 1890 treatise, stated that when an invention is used
for experimental purposes "the interests of the patentee are not antagonized." 3 WILLIAM C.
ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 898 (1890), quoted in Petition for
a Writ of Certiorari at 10, Duke Univ. v. Madey, 123 S. Ct. 2639 (2003) (No. 02-1007) (on file
with author).
37. See Jordan P. Karp, Note, Experimental Use as Patent Infringement: The Impropriety of a
Broad Exception, 100 YALE L.J. 2169, 2180 (1991) ("[Nloncommercial investigations ... do not
threaten the potential gains that the patent grant safeguards for the patentee. At the same time, this
level of experimental activity is advantageous because it fosters the quest to expand human
knowledge.").
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